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Abstract. Short-term orientation aimed at maximizing quarterly results at the expense 
of long-term corporate performance and survival has become severely criticized. In the 
face of continuously decreasing chief executive officer (CEO) tenure, CEOs, however, 
seem to have few incentives to embrace long-term oriented behaviour. Instead, the ques-
tion of foremost importance to self-interested CEOs is whether short-term orientation 
already harms financial performance in the three to four years of their own tenure, and 
whether CEOs stand a chance of benefiting from long-term orientation while still in office. 
CEOs thus face an intriguing ethical dilemma between optimizing their financial pay-off 
within their own tenure and securing the longer-term well-being of the corporation, its 
employees, and other major stakeholders. Consequently, our longitudinal study focuses 
on the medium-term performance implications of short-term and long-term orientation in 
Europe’s largest publicly listed companies. Results indicate that short-term orientation 
negatively impacts on medium term performance while long-term oriented behavior is 
positively associated with corporate performance in the medium term. Our findings ad-
vance managerial myopia theory, and provide insights into one of the most central ethical 
dilemmas faced by corporate executives today.
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1. Introduction
“The new continental European banking culture should value long-term thinking in-
stead of short-termism and financial alchemy” (Horst Köhler, former German Federal 
President, 2008).
In the face of the global financial (subprime) crisis which is reasoned to be brought 
about largely by excessive short-term thinking, societal expectations towards corporate 
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executives to live up to their stewardship roles and long-term responsibilities have in-
creased dramatically. As a consequence, the issue of how to curb short-term orientation 
has risen not only to the top of political agendas worldwide but has also become most 
prominent in the scientific and practical discourse in the area of corporate governance 
(e.g., Dallas 2012).
Even before the financial crisis, several initiatives have been launched dedicated to re-
asserting long-term orientation in business decision-making and investing. For instance, 
in the U.S., a number of prominent firms, including Pfizer Inc, PepsiCo, and Xerox 
Corporation, agreed to subscribe to a set of guiding principles (Aspen Principles) meant 
to enforce greater long-term orientation in their corporate activities. These and other 
initiatives are largely driven by the concern about an excessive short-term orientation 
of corporate executives of publicly listed companies. Short-term orientation – or often 
termed short-termism – is defined as the excessive focus of corporate executives, inves-
tors, and analysts on short-term quarterly earnings at the expense of long-term corporate 
strategy, performance, and sustainability (Porter 1992; Sappideen 2011; Stein 1988).
But despite these initiatives and the evidently harmful effects of short-term orientation 
on long-term firm performance and survival, more than 75% of chief financial officers 
(CFOs) acknowledge choosing investments with lower net present value (NPV) due to a 
shorter payoff horizon (Graham et al. 2005). Today, top management teams (TMT) face 
a major dilemma in respect to long-term oriented behavior. Recent management surveys 
have shown that average tenure of CEOs in major publicly listed Western European 
corporations is approximately four years (Lucier et al. 2006). This number is expected 
to decrease further over the next few years – not least due to a lack of trust and growing 
impatience of shareholders with corporate executives. In today’s business environment, 
CEOs thus seem to have few incentives to take long-term oriented measures as CEOs 
are very unlikely to actually reap the benefits of long-term oriented measures given their 
continuously shorter tenure. 
Conversely, against the backdrop of shorter CEO tenure, short-term oriented behavior 
seems to be associated with higher gains for CEOs. However, what has often been left 
ill-considered is that this only holds true if these short-term measures do not ‘backfire’ 
within the CEO’s own tenure in the particular firm. For instance, managerial opportunism 
theory has argued that short-term behavior might be an optimal choice from a manager’s 
perspective. Using moral hazard models, it has been shown that managers prefer short-
term investments that pay off quickly to enhance personal reputation (Campbell, Marino 
1994; Narayanan 1985), or that managers are preoccupied with job safety and therefore 
favour short-term relative to long-term payoffs (Hirshleifer, Thakor 1992). These views, 
however, do not consider any negative backlash effects of such short-term behavior 
within the CEO’s approximately three to four year long tenure in the particular firm.
In essence, CEOs of large publicly listed firms today are not so much concerned about 
either the short-term or the long-term. Instead, CEOs are most of all interested in maxi-
mizing financial returns over their expected three to four year tenure period. What 
is of primary interest to them are thus the medium-term performance implications of 
short-term and long-term oriented behavior. This strong interest in the medium-term 
performance implications has been spurred by the fact that many compensation and 
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bonus schemes nowadays have a build-in holding period for shares or options of usu-
ally three to four years.
So far, however, the medium-term performance implications of short-term and long-
term oriented managerial behavior have remained unexplored. The current paper aims 
to fill this gap. In contrast to previous research which relied on a single indicator (i.e, 
R&D expenses) to measure long-term orientation (e.g., Bushee 1998; David et al. 2001; 
Graves 1988; Hansen, Hill 1991; Zahra 1996), we devise – based on family firm re-
search – a broader set of indicators for short-term and long-term orientation in three key 
organizational dimensions – human resource development, business portfolio develop-
ment and corporate investment behavior. We then empirically explore the impact of 
short-term and long-term oriented behavior in these three key organizational dimensions 
on medium-term financial performance. Across all three organizational dimensions, we 
find that short-term oriented behavior is found to be negatively associated with medium-
term financial performance while long-term oriented behavior is positively associated 
with medium-term financial performance. Our findings thus inform managerial myopia 
theory (Stein 1988) which has spurred a controversial discourse on the influence of 
short-run managerial actions on firm performance in the areas of management science 
and financial and business economics. The existing paradigm of managerial myopia 
theory is extended by indicating that short-term orientation already starts negatively 
impacting firm performance in the medium-term. Importantly, our results suggest that 
the widely held assumption that short-term orientation is generally aligned with manage-
rial self-interest while long-term orientation stands in stark contradiction to managerial 
self-interest seems too simplistic; especially so, if we consider the prevalent nature of 
today’s compensation and bonus schemes with three to four year holding periods for 
stock and option payments.
2. Extant research on short-term and long-term orientation
In strategic management research, previous studies have almost exclusively focused on 
the antecedents of short-term oriented managerial behavior. Flawed management prac-
tices (e.g., Hayes, Abernathy 1980; Miller 2002), stock-market myopia (Laverty 1996; 
Stein 1989) and managerial self-interest (Campbell, Marino 1994; Narayanan 1985) 
are the most commonly named reasons for short-term oriented managerial behavior. In 
a recent and fine-grained study of individual, group, firm-level and environmental fac-
tors affecting managerial short-term orientation, Marginson and Mcaulay (2008) find 
evidence that short-term orientation also has a strong social dimension. Specifically, 
short-term orientation is found to be positively associated with managers’ individual 
experience of role ambiguity. Additionally, the study finds evidence that individual 
manager’s short-term orientation is positively associated with other group member’s 
short-term orientation. 
In finance and economics, the debate has centered less on the sources of short-term 
orientation but on the basic question whether stock-markets (i.e. investors, analysts) 
are short-term oriented at all or not. Studies in this area have focused on the reactions 
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by the stock-market in response to firms’ R&D investment decisions (Chan et al. 1990; 
Jacobson, Aaker 1993; Jarrell et al. 1985; Woolridge, Snow 1990). Most of these stud-
ies come to the result that firms’ market values are positively related to R&D outlays. 
Woolridge (1988) and Chan et al. (1990) find that even announcements of increases in 
R&D investments are associated with market value increases. This has been taken as 
evidence that stock-markets are not myopic.
Common to both streams of inquiry in strategic management as well as in economics 
and finance research (except for the studies by Laverty 1996 and Marginson, Mcaulay 
2008) is the primary reliance on research and development (R&D) expenses as a single 
indicator for firms’ long-term orientation. For several reasons, however, we believe 
that this indicator is likely to be an inappropriate and imprecise measure of long-term 
orientation. First, the assumption that R&D spending is generally long-term is highly 
questionable. Earlier, Laverty (1993) convincingly disputed this assumption and showed 
that R&D data included many short-term projects. Second, R&D spending is an unsuit-
able proxy to capture long-term orientation in service firms since these firms simply 
do not list such a position in their profit and loss statements. Third, by using R&D 
spending, studies – if at all – only capture long-term orientation in corporate investment 
behavior. Other important organizational dimensions are left unconsidered. For instance, 
changes to the human resource profile of a firm as well changes to a firm’s business 
portfolio seem important organizational dimensions in which short-term or long-term 
orientation are likely to generate very different results. Past research thus advocated the 
development of new measures for short-term and long-term orientation along several 
organizational dimensions (Laverty 1996; Marginson, Mcaulay 2008).
Overall, it becomes apparent that previous research has been exclusively concerned 
with the antecedents of long-term and short-term orientation. In contrast, relatively little 
research attention has been directed towards the optimality of these orientations in the 
medium-term. This, however, seems most critical given CEOs average tenure of ap-
proximately three to four years and given compensation and bonus schemes which also 
focus TMTs’ attention on the medium-term. Moreover, previous management research 
has relied on a single indicator for long-term and short-term orientation – the overall 
level of R&D spending respectively the change in R&D spending from one year to the 
other. This measure, however, seems somehow imprecise and its application limited 
necessitating the development of new proxies for firms’ extent of short-term and long-
term orientation. 
3. Alternative secondary measures for short-term  
and long-term orientation and hypotheses 
In earlier research, the neglect of alternative secondary measures of short-term and long-
term orientation has been lamented as the most far-reaching challenge to advance the 
current debate on short-termism (Laverty 1996: 851; Marginson, Mcaulay 2008)1. For 
1 The need to devise new measures of long-term orientation has been recognized also in marketing 
research (i.e., Bearden et al. 2006).
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deriving suitable secondary proxies of long-term respectively short-term orientation, we 
relied on family firm literature and specifically an analysis of the primary characteristics 
of family firms which are put forward in this literature. This approach was grounded in 
the fact that greater long-term orientation is often considered a competitive advantage of 
family firms relative to non-family firms. In fact, performance differences between fam-
ily firms and public firms have been argued to primarily result from the fact that “fami-
lies potentially have longer horizons than other shareholders, suggesting a willingness 
to invest in long-term projects relative to shorter managerial horizons” (Anderson, Reeb 
2003: 1305; James 1999; Le Breton-Miller, Miller 2006; Miller, Breton-Miller 2005).
Based on family firm research, family firms seem to differ from non-family firms along 
three major organizational dimensions: human resource development, business portfolio 
management and investment behavior.
Human Resource Management. A major hallmark of family firms is that they have been 
found to avoid major fluctuations both in their overall workforce as well as their senior 
management ranks in comparison to non-family firms (Guzzo, Abbott 1990; Miller, Le 
Breton-Miller 2003). Long-term oriented family firms are thought to weather temporary 
market downturns without resorting to major downsizing. Reason is that the knowledge 
and experience of senior managers and the workforce are seen as valuable assets which 
are costly to replace or to rebuild. In line with this notion, Mr Wendelin Wiedeking, 
former CEO of the family owned German sports car manufacturer Porsche AG, which 
is known for its long-term orientation once said: “Long-term orientation and long-term 
employability go hand in hand”. In contrast, short-term oriented firms are likely to react 
very sensitive to unfavourable temporary market conditions or below expected quarterly 
or annual returns. Research on corporate downsizing has shown that stock-markets react 
positive to downsizing announcements (e.g., Chalos, Chen 2002). Downsizing is thus a 
proven method to increase short-term performance while its long-term effects are highly 
questionable due to a loss of trust and commitment in the organization. 
The fact that enduringness of a relationship is a key component of a firm’s long-term 
orientation can also be deduced from research on buyer-supplier relationships (Lee, 
Dawes 2005; Ryu et al. 2007). In this research, long-term orientation has among other 
items been measured by the willingness to make sacrifices to help the seller from time 
to time and the expected length of time the buyer and the seller will work together.
The notion that long-term orientation goes hand in hand with a stable development of 
the workforce is further supported by the British Trade Union Congress (TCU) report 
published in 2006 on “investment chains: addressing corporate and investor short-ter-
mism”. The TUC report (2006) argues that long-term orientation comprises the retention 
of and investment in employees on a long-term basis, rather than look for quick fixes 
to meet the demands of investors. Together, these aspects underscore that variability in 
the workforce may seem a valid proxy for short-term orientation. 
Since extant theory does not provide any predictions on the optimality of short-term 
orientation in human resource management for the medium-term, we offer two compet-
ing hypotheses:
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H1a: Greater variability in the number of employees is positively related to medium-
term firm profitability.
H1b: Greater variability in the number of employees is negatively related to medium-
term firm profitability. 
As mentioned above, family firm research suggests that family-owned firms are also 
characterized by greater stability in their senior management ranks when compared 
with non-family firms. This stability in senior management ranks is said to correlate 
with longer time horizons and longer-term investment in focal capabilities (Le Breton-
Miller, Miller 2006). In contrast, short-term oriented firms are much more likely to 
quickly replace top managers in case certain performance hurdle rates have not been 
met. Consequently, short-term oriented firms are likely to be characterized by greater 
variability in top management team (TMT) size. Similar to downsizing of the work-
force, the replacement of top level managers in low performing firms has been shown 
to lead to increases in market valuation in the short-term. This effect is explained by the 
higher likelihood of the new top management to take severe measures (i.e., divestiture 
of low-performing units). 
Again, due to the absence of sound theoretical predictions and the absence of previ-
ous empirical findings regarding the medium-term performance effects of short-term 
oriented human resource management, we hypothesize:
H2a: Variability in TMT size is positively associated with medium-term firm profit-
ability. 
H2b: Variability in TMT size is negatively associated with medium-term firm profit-
ability. 
Business Portfolio Management. Another indication for family firms’ long-term orien-
tation has been their willingness to sustain a business in times of trouble (Le Breton-
Miller, Miller 2006). Family firms are thus commonly perceived to pursue a continu-
ous and more balanced portfolio development strategy compared to non-family firms. 
Primarily, this implies that long-term oriented firms disdain from excessive acquisition 
activity. Instead, long-term oriented firms show a fairly even level of acquisition activity 
over time. In contrast, short-term oriented firms are likely to act much more opportun-
istically in their acquisition behavior and thus show much greater variability in their 
acquisition behavior. For instance, short-term oriented firms are likely to embark on ma-
jor acquisition sprees if they perceive that the market is generally undervaluing targets 
though this may cause indigestion problems for the firm in later periods. Consequently, 
as part of long-term orientation, the TUC report (2006) demands a “cool-headed, bal-
anced approach to mergers and acquisitions”. Overall, we thus hypothesize:
H3a: Variability in a firm’s acquisition behavior is positively associated with medium-
term performance. 
H3b: Variability in a firm’s acquisition behavior is negatively associated with medium-
term performance. 
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Corporate Investment Behavior. As mentioned above, firms’ investment behavior has 
been used as the most common proxy for firm short-term and long-term orientation. 
Given the disadvantages of R&D expenses as a proxy for long-term orientation, we 
suggest an alternative measure which is also based on insights from family research. In 
family firm research, it is argued that family CEOs are not haunted by quarterly results 
and are more willing to inject profits back into the business on a stable and continuous 
basis (e.g., Kets de Vries 1993). Similarly Le Breton-Miller and Miller (2006) argue 
that a hallmark of long-term oriented family firms is that they invest deeply and con-
tinuously in the competencies and facilities required to attain the core mission of the 
firm. In contrast, short-term oriented investors and firms are more likely to favour that 
free cash flows are distributed to shareholders in form of dividends leading to increased 
attractiveness of the firm’s stock in the short-term. Consequently, we regard capital 
expenditures into operations as a suitable proxy for long-term orientation in firms’ in-
vestment behavior. 
H4a: Capital expenditures into operations are positively associated with medium-term 
performance. 
H4b: Capital expenditures into operations are negatively associated with medium-term 
performance. 
4. Methods
To test the medium-term performance implications of short-term and long-term ori-
ented behavior in these three organizational dimensions, we compiled a panel data set 
of firms that were listed on either the Dow Jones Eurostoxx 50 or Dow Jones Stoxx 
50 in 1996 and on which relevant data were available. In total, our panel thus contains 
73 firms which we tracked for a period of eleven years (1996–2006). We focus on a 
sample of European firms since empirical evidence on the subject matter has been 
scarce for European countries with previous empirical research on managerial myopia 
exclusively focused on the US. Moreover, research in cross-cultural management has 
argued that material differences in time orientation exist between US and European 
firms which makes a focus on European firms interesting to explore potential differences 
(Hofstede, G., Hofstede, J. G. 2003). Additionally, our focus on European firms seems 
methodically more robust than a “mixed” sample given differences in accounting stand-
ards across US and European firms. 1996 was chosen as the starting point for our empir-
ical analysis since shareholder activism and the issue of short-term orientation became a 
prominent topic in public debate in the mid-90s. Moreover, data coverage on European 
publicly listed firms is poor prior to 1996. Further, the time period from 1996 to 2006 
covers both economic downturns as well as upturns so that our findings are unlikely to 
be distorted by one-sided cyclical economic effects. 2006 seemed an appropriate cut-off 
point for our data analysis to avoid confounding effects from the subprime crisis which 
started in 2007. Both the Dow Jones Eurostoxx 50 and the Dow Jones Stoxx 50 include 
a wide variety of industries, thereby reducing as much as possible potential industry 
and survival biases. Organizational and financial data were collected from Thomson 
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OneBanker. Data on the firms’ acquisition activity during the eight year period was 
extracted from the Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum database provided by 
Thomson Financial. 
Dependent Variable. Our dependent variable is return on assets (ROA). To capture the 
medium-term performance effects of short-term and long-term orientation, we work 
with a three year industry-adjusted average. A three year time window also corresponds 
with prior conceptualizations of short-term and long-term performance (e.g., Le Breton-
Miller, Miller 2006; Papadakis 1998). For instance, Papadakis (1998) uses 2-year aver-
ages to determine short-term performance and five year averages to determine long-term 
performance. Also, given CEOs’ average tenure of approximately 4 years and expecta-
tions that tenure is going to decrease further (Le Breton-Miller, Miller 2006; Lucier 
et al. 2006), a three year performance average seemed appropriate to assess medium-
term performance. 
Independent Variables. As mentioned earlier, we use two indicators to assess short-
term orientation in human resource management. First, variability in the workforce was 
measured as the relative year-to-year change in a firm’s number of employees. Second, 
variability in TMT size was measured as the relative year-to-year change in the number 
of TMT members. 
To assess short-term orientation in business portfolio management, we use the variabil-
ity in acquisition activity. Short-term orientated firms have been argued to act oppor-
tunistically and thus show great variance in their level of organizational activity, while 
long-term oriented firms are generally assumed to pursue a steady portfolio develop-
ment. We measured the variability in acquisition activity as the relative year-to-year 
change in the total number of acquisitions conducted by the firms. 
To assess the degree of long-term orientation in firm investment behavior, we used the 
capital expenditure to assets ratio (Capex ratio). This ratio is commonly used to assess 
the extent to which firms invest in preserving and enhancing their existing asset base. 
It is assumed that long-term oriented firms continuously invest in their asset base while 
short-term oriented firms are more likely to use funds to satisfy investors’ needs, for 
instance, through higher dividend payouts. The Capex ratio was operationalized as the 
firms’ capital expenditures divided by firms’ total assets. 
Control Variables. For our analyses, we used a standard set of controls. Firm diversifi-
cation was included as a control because it has also been shown to potentially influence 
firm performance. Following the convention of prior research (Bergh 1995; Hoskisson, 
Johnson 1992), we measured firm diversification using the concentration ratio which 
was measured as the sales of the largest business relative to the firm’s total sales. Next, 
we controlled for firm size. In keeping with prior research (e.g., Sanders 2001), we 
measured firm size as the natural logarithm of firm total sales. Since CEO tenure has 
been found to influence board vigilance (e.g., Hill, Phan 1991), we control for CEO ten-
ure which is defined as the number of years a CEO has been in office. Further, to control 
for previous firm performance we incorporated firms’ previous return on assets (ROA) 
in our set of controls (Walters et al. 2007). Additionally, we used the debt-to-equity ratio 
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and current ratio (current assets/current liabilities) as controls for the financial structure 
of the firm. In keeping with prior research, we used a year trend variable to account for 
differences across time (Deutsch et al. 2007). All independent variables and controls 
were lagged by one period2.
To explore the medium-term performance implications of short-term and long-term 
oriented managerial behavior, we estimated fixed effects cross-sectional time series 
regressions. Fixed effects OLS corrects for autocorrelation of disturbances due to time 
invariant firm-specific effects by inserting an error term that is assumed to be constant 
over time (Kennedy 1998). We chose the more conservative fixed effect model over 
a random effects model since the results of a Hausman test (Greene 2008; Hausman 
et al. 1984) rejected the randomness of residuals hypothesis. As part of our robustness 
analysis, however, we also compared results to the random-effects model and found that 
results remained qualitatively identical in the fixed and random-effects models. In fact, 
coefficients were estimated more precisely in the latter. This lends additional confidence 
to our conclusions (Wooldridge 2001).
5. Results
The descriptive statistics and correlations are shown in Table 1. We find that the predic-
tor variables are not strongly correlated among themselves or with any of the control 
variables. Thus, multicollinearity does not seem to be an issue in our data.
Validity Analyses. Before testing our initial Hypotheses (1a–4b), we conducted several 
analyses to test for the validity of our indicators for short-term and long-term orienta-
tion. These analyses seemed necessary as our indicators had been derived by research on 
family firms but have not been confirmed as suitable indicators for firms’ short-term and 
long-term orientation in previous empirical research efforts. For this purpose, we tested 
the short-term performance effects of our indicators. In order to do so, we used multiple 
short-term outcome measures as dependent variables – namely one-year ROA, earnings 
before taxes (EBIT), and market value (MV). The variability in number of employees 
was found to have a strong positive effect on short-term market performance (p < 0.05). 
This is in line with previous studies showing positive stock-market effects (so-called 
cumulative abnormal returns) for downsizing measures. The variability in TMT size 
was associated with strong positive effects in both short-term ROA (p < 0.05) and EBIT 
(p < 0.1). The variability in acquisition behavior was found to be the strongest indicator 
for short-term orientation. For all three short-term performance measures, we found a 
strong, positive relationship with variability in acquisitions (p < 0.05). For the capital 
expenditures to assets ratio – our single indicator for long-term orientation – we found 
that it is negatively associated with short-term EBIT (p < 0.1). Overall, the validity of 
our measures can thus be judged satisfactory.
2 It would have been desirable to also include corporate executives’ compensation structure as con-
trols. However, this data is not available for European firms during this period. Even today, in many 
European jurisdictions companies are still not obliged to publicly report corporate executive com-
pensation. 
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Hypothesis Testing. The OLS fixed effects regression estimates for our analyses on the 
medium-term performance effects of short-term and long-term orientation in human 
resource management, business portfolio management and corporate investment behav-
ior are presented in Table 2. For all models, we used robust standard errors. Using the 
robust command in Stata has the advantage of taking heteroscedasticity into account 
while coefficient estimates are exactly the same as in straightforward OLS regression. 
Table 2. Predictor variables regressed on medium-term financial performance (3–year ROA) 
Variable
ROA (3–year average)




Variability of TMT Size
–0.01
(0.002)**







0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Prior Performance
–0.24 –0.24 –0.28 –0.27 –0.27
(0.08)*** (0.07)*** (0.06)*** (0.07)*** (0.07)***
Firm Size
–0.02 –0.02 –0.02 –0.02 –0.02
(0.01) (0.01)* (0.01)* (0.01)** (0.01)
Debt-to-Equity
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Current Ratio
–0.00 –0.00 –0.00 0.01 –0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)* (0.01)
CEO Tenure
–0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00 –0.00
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Year
0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004
(0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)**
Constant
–7.99 –7.99 –6.18 –6.06 –7.91
(3.08)** (3.08)** (2.20)** (2.49)** (2.86)**
R-square 0.26 0.27 0.34 0.37 0.27
F-value 7.38*** 6.83*** 9.76*** 6.89*** 6.45***
Notes: n = 411; Robust t-statistics in parentheses; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***sig-
nificant at 1%.
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All models are highly significant (p < 0.01), and have considerable explanatory power. 
Model 1 in Table 2 represents our base model with just the controls. Results on the 
control variables emphasize the influence of prior performance on firms’ medium-term 
performance. Prior firm performance is strongly negatively related to firms’ medium-
term performance (p < 0.01).
Models II and III display the results for short-term orientation in human resource man-
agement. As shown in Model II, we find that short-term orientation proxied by the 
variability in the number of employees is negatively related to medium-term firm per-
formance (p < 0.1). Model III also lends evidence for a negative impact of short-term 
oriented human resource management on medium-term performance. The variability in 
TMT size is negatively related to medium-term firm performance (p < 0.05). Hypoth-
eses 1b and 2b are thus supported. 
Model IV shows the impact of short-term oriented business portfolio management on 
medium-term financial performance. In line with Hypothesis 3b, the variability in firm 
acquisition behavior is strongly negatively associated with medium-term financial per-
formance (p < 0.01). This result chimes in with research on organizational growth. Pre-
vious research has shown that firms with stable growth patterns (in terms of firm sales) 
outperform those firms which show a high degree of volatility in their growth patterns 
(Brauer, Laamanen 2008; Laamanen, Keil 2008).
Model V highlights the effect of long-term oriented corporate investment behavior on 
medium-term financial performance. In correspondence with the results above and with 
Hypothesis 4a, we find that long-term oriented investment behavior is positively asso-
ciated with medium-term financial performance. Specifically, Capex ratio is positively 
related to medium-term financial performance (p < 0.05). 
Robustness tests. We further conducted some post-hoc empirical analyses to test for 
the robustness of our empirical results. Specifically, we re-ran our analyses utilizing 
the firms’ medium-term stock-market performance measured as the three year market 
value adjusted by dividend payments as dependent variable. When comparing the results 
across the two types of analyses, we find consistent results for the effects of variability 
in TMT size (p < 0.1), variability in acquisition behaviour (p < 0.01), and Capex ratio 
(p < 0 .1) on medium-term accounting and stock-market performance. Only the relation-
ship between variability in workforce and medium-term stock-market performance is 
found to be non-significant. In sum, we thus find that the relationships between our pre-
dictor variables and medium-term stock-market performance remain widely consistent 
but are statistically weaker when compared with their influence on the firms’ medium-
term accounting performance. The weaker statistical relationships are explained by the 
fact that in general a firm’s stock-market performance is influenced by a much greater 
host of factors than a firm’s accounting performance, and that the predictor variables 
are more closely tied to a firm’s accounting performance than to a firm’s stock-market 
performance. 
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6. Discussion and implications for theory and practice
In public debate, the global financial (‘subprime’) crisis has frequently been argued 
to have resulted mainly from ‘subprime’, short-term oriented leadership by corporate 
executives including skewed incentive structures for mortgage dealers and traders that 
favour the short term over the long term. Consequently, the issue of curbing short-term 
orientation has come to the forefront of discussions in corporate governance research 
and practice. Our study thus directly relates to this current and ongoing debate in cor-
porate governance research and practice (e.g., Dallas 2012; Sappideen 2011). 
Our study extends research on short-term and long-term orientation by developing a 
new set of (secondary data) indicators to assess firms’ degree of short-term and long-
term orientation. Drawing on family firm research, we derive four indicators in firms’ 
human resource management (i.e., variability in the workforce, variability in TMT size), 
portfolio management (i.e., variability in acquisition behavior) and investment behavior 
(i.e., capex ratio). Preliminary analyses suggest that these indicators show satisfactory 
validity as measures for firms’ short-term and long-term orientation. The study is thus 
responsive to prior research that criticized extant proxies for long-term orientation (i.e., 
R&D spending) and advocated the development of new measures along several organi-
zational dimensions (Laverty 1996; Marginson, Mcaulay 2008). 
Most importantly, we focus on a “sweet spot” in the theoretical discussion on short-
term and long-term orientation by assessing their medium-term financial impact. The 
concept of intertemporal choice simply suggests that short-term oriented behavior is 
suboptimal behavior focusing on the short-term to the detriment of the long-term. It 
has remained unclear at which point in time short-term orientation will start to produce 
weaker results than long-term orientation. Our results suggest that, at least, for the 
key organizational dimensions considered in our study, short-term orientation already 
starts to lose out to long-term orientation in the medium-term (3-years). Our results 
thus reorient the discussion on managerial myopia. The widely held assumption that 
short-term orientation is generally aligned with managerial self-interest while long-term 
orientation stands in stark contradiction to managerial self-interest seems too simplistic; 
especially so if we consider CEO’s average tenure and the fact that modern compensa-
tion and bonus schemes have build-in holding periods of three to four years for TMTs’ 
stock and option payments. Importantly, our empirical findings are in line with some of 
the most recent studies in accounting research using the extent of firms’ real earnings 
management and quarterly earnings guidance as a proxy for managerial short-termism 
(e.g., Cheng et al. 2007; Zhao et al. 2012)3. Based on a sample of US firms, Zhao et al. 
(2012), for example, find that abnormal real earnings management is generally associ-
ated with lower industry-adjusted cash flows from operating activities in the subsequent 
three years. Cheng et al. (2007), who also draw upon a US sample, find support for 
3 According to Ewert and Wagenhofer (2005: 1102), real earnings management is defined as adjusting 
the timing, magnitude and/or structure of real business transactions with an intent to alter reported 
earnings in order to meet analyst forecasts. The definition implies that such changes are costly to the 
firm in the medium to long-term.
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the fact that firms which give quarterly earnings guidance experience adverse effects 
on earnings growth in subsequent years (2003–2005). Conversely, however, Taylor and 
Xu (2010) who use matched-sample analysis to investigate the consequences of real 
earnings management activities on firms’ subsequent operating performance find that 
firms identified as manipulating operations to manage earnings do not experience a sig-
nificant decline in their subsequent operating performances (i.e., ROA, operating cash 
flow, size adjusted returns). Some of the equivocality in past research on the effects of 
real earnings management on medium-term performance may stem from the fact that 
real activities manipulation has been proxied by abnormal levels of production costs, 
discretionary expenditures, and cash flow from operations. The proxies introduced in 
the current study may serve as a viable alternative to detect real earnings management, 
and thus complement the existing stream of research on managerial myopia in account-
ing research. 
Practical Implications. We believe that both our analytical approach to assessing 
short-term and long-term orientation as well as our empirical results provide action-
able knowledge to corporate managers and boards of directors. The set of indicators 
we devised for assessing short-term and long-term orientation can be readily used by 
both managers and boards as metrics for determining their firm’s degree of short-term 
and long-term orientation. Our set of indicators can then also be used to benchmark the 
firm’s degree of short-term and long-term orientation in comparison to industry peers. 
To some extent, this may help boards to intervene in due time if these indicators suggest 
an excessive focus on the short-term. In combination with our empirical results, such 
benchmarking with industry peers may also be used as an effective communication tool 
towards investors but also towards other important stakeholder groups to invoke trust 
and commitment (e.g., employees, trade unions). Further, we provide actionable knowl-
edge by pointing out three key organizational dimensions where long-term orientation 
seems particularly appropriate and, in fact, critical to firm performance. Last but not 
least, we hope that our empirical results may serve as an encouragement to short-term 
oriented managers to reorient their behavior and help reassure long-term oriented man-
agers to stick with their overall course. Results show that managers may well benefit 
from long-term oriented behavior within their own tenure if they act in due time.
7. Limitations and future research
Our indicators for short-term and long-term orientation were derived based on amble 
previous research on family firms which emphasized long-term orientation as a competi-
tive edge of family firms in comparison to non-family firms. Though previous family 
firm research greatly supports this notion, more recent trends highlight that we should 
get more cautious about equating family firms with long-term orientation as some fam-
ily firms become more finance-oriented and earnings driven. A substantial number of 
family firms today has institutionalized so-called family offices which operate just like 
investment funds on the basis of fixed performance hurdle rates. Family firms with 
such an organizational control structure are likely to lose the long-term oriented traits 
which have been characteristic for family firms in the past. Further, it needs to be noted 
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that though our measures of short-term and long-term orientation are well grounded in 
family firm research and though initial validity tests indicate that they may be suitable 
secondary proxies, there is greater need to investigate the validity of our measures. In 
general, the construction of new measures – both secondary and survey measures – for 
short-term and long-term orientation provides an important and much needed avenue 
for future research.
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